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The annual arenas are held twice a year, but not all...

@Italiya said in #160:

You wrote that if it were not for the possibility to view the history of the arenas, then it could be called deliberate misleading.
This is a blatant misrepresentation of what I wrote. Here’s the exact quote from my message:
"If information were only available through such means and there would be no arenas that take place once a year, I would say the name always misleads."
Where exactly does it say that the absence of the possibility to view the history of the arenas would mean deliberate misleading? What I wrote is that in such a case the misleading would happen always, and I would use “will” instead of “can.” But that does not imply that the constant misleading would be the result of an intentional attempt to deceive.

@Italiya said in #160:

And what has changed? Let's assume that the history cannot be viewed. And how will you prove what intentions were pursued?
However, in this case, you already agree that this is a deception.

But what changes globally? Has the name suddenly become a deception?
Globally — nothing would change. And no, I did not agree that in such a case it would be deception. Either you don’t remember what I wrote, or you are intentionally misrepresenting it.

The existence of the history only explains why it is correct to use “can” instead of “will,” which is exactly what I did. But in both cases, this would not prove deception without evidence of intent.

I have already explained several times how intent could be proven — see, for example, message #124.

@Italiya said in #160: > You wrote that if it were not for the possibility to view the history of the arenas, then it could be called deliberate misleading. This is a blatant misrepresentation of what I wrote. Here’s the exact quote from my message: "If information were only available through such means and there would be no arenas that take place once a year, I would say the name always misleads." Where exactly does it say that the absence of the possibility to view the history of the arenas would mean deliberate misleading? What I wrote is that in such a case the misleading would happen always, and I would use “will” instead of “can.” But that does not imply that the constant misleading would be the result of an intentional attempt to deceive. @Italiya said in #160: > And what has changed? Let's assume that the history cannot be viewed. And how will you prove what intentions were pursued? > However, in this case, you already agree that this is a deception. > > But what changes globally? Has the name suddenly become a deception? Globally — nothing would change. And no, I did not agree that in such a case it would be deception. Either you don’t remember what I wrote, or you are intentionally misrepresenting it. The existence of the history only explains why it is correct to use “can” instead of “will,” which is exactly what I did. But in both cases, this would not prove deception without evidence of intent. I have already explained several times how intent could be proven — see, for example, message #124.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #161:

Well, it certainly doesn't distort the history of the arenas and the schedule much.

Especially since it still applies to the history of the arenas.

There is no difference between can mislead and constantly misleads?

That is, an intentionally deceptive name of an arena is misleading, but does not deceive... How so?
It is deliberately false.
If it is proven that it is intentionally false and misleading - this is what distinguishes intentional misleading from unintentional.

First, the fact of intentional deception is recorded, then the motives are clarified. There may be no motive at all, if you do not understand this point.

For example, I named the arena that way, it is proven that it was intentional, but if I am asked, I will say - just like that.
That's it, innocent?

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #161: > Well, it certainly doesn't distort the history of the arenas and the schedule much. Especially since it still applies to the history of the arenas. There is no difference between can mislead and constantly misleads? That is, an intentionally deceptive name of an arena is misleading, but does not deceive... How so? It is deliberately false. If it is proven that it is intentionally false and misleading - this is what distinguishes intentional misleading from unintentional. First, the fact of intentional deception is recorded, then the motives are clarified. There may be no motive at all, if you do not understand this point. For example, I named the arena that way, it is proven that it was intentional, but if I am asked, I will say - just like that. That's it, innocent?

@Italiya said in #162:

There is no difference between can mislead and constantly misleads?
From the perspective of "deceptive," there is no difference. Neither of them proves deception.

@Italiya said in #162:

That is, an intentionally deceptive name of an arena is misleading, but does not deceive... How so?
Because "intentionally chosen to mislead" and "intentionally chosen to do something else" are different intentions.
To prove "deceive," you need to prove "intentionally chosen to mislead," not just prove that the name was chosen intentionally.

@Italiya said in #162:

It is deliberately false.
Choosing a name that is false from an inductive point of view intentionally does not prove that it was chosen intentionally to mislead.

Intention to mislead is what distinguishes intentional misleading from unintentional — not the mere fact that the name was chosen intentionally or that it is false from an inductive point of view.

@Italiya said in #162:

First, the fact of intentional deception is recorded, then the motives are clarified. There may be no motive at all, if you do not understand this point.
In logic and jurisprudence, it works the other way around. First, you prove that the action was performed intentionally with the purpose of misleading, and only after that the fact of deception is considered proven. If there is no such motive, then it cannot be considered deception.

This can be expressed as:
(I ∧ M) D, where:

I = action was done with the intention to mislead
M = the action misleads
D = it is deception

Just M (misleads) ≠ D.
Just I (intentional, but not for misleading) ≠ D.
Both I and M are required for D to be true.

For example, when you attributed to me something I did not claim, that’s an error — but not deception until I prove you did it intentionally to replace my argument, and not simply by mistake.

@Italiya said in #162:

For example, I named the arena that way, it is proven that it was intentional, but if I am asked, I will say - just like that.
That's it, innocent?
Exactly. If it’s proven that you chose the name intentionally but I have no proof that you did so with the intention to mislead, then I can say the name is misleading and false from an inductive point of view, but I cannot say it is deception.

This is how it works in logic and jurisprudence.

@Italiya said in #162: > There is no difference between can mislead and constantly misleads? From the perspective of "deceptive," there is no difference. Neither of them proves deception. @Italiya said in #162: > That is, an intentionally deceptive name of an arena is misleading, but does not deceive... How so? Because "intentionally chosen to mislead" and "intentionally chosen to do something else" are different intentions. To prove "deceive," you need to prove "intentionally chosen to mislead," not just prove that the name was chosen intentionally. @Italiya said in #162: > It is deliberately false. Choosing a name that is false from an inductive point of view intentionally does not prove that it was chosen intentionally to mislead. Intention to mislead is what distinguishes intentional misleading from unintentional — not the mere fact that the name was chosen intentionally or that it is false from an inductive point of view. @Italiya said in #162: > First, the fact of intentional deception is recorded, then the motives are clarified. There may be no motive at all, if you do not understand this point. In logic and jurisprudence, it works the other way around. First, you prove that the action was performed intentionally with the purpose of misleading, and only after that the fact of deception is considered proven. If there is no such motive, then it cannot be considered deception. This can be expressed as: (I ∧ M) D, where: I = action was done with the intention to mislead M = the action misleads D = it is deception Just M (misleads) ≠ D. Just I (intentional, but not for misleading) ≠ D. Both I and M are required for D to be true. For example, when you attributed to me something I did not claim, that’s an error — but not deception until I prove you did it intentionally to replace my argument, and not simply by mistake. @Italiya said in #162: > For example, I named the arena that way, it is proven that it was intentional, but if I am asked, I will say - just like that. > That's it, innocent? Exactly. If it’s proven that you chose the name intentionally but I have no proof that you did so with the intention to mislead, then I can say the name is misleading and false from an inductive point of view, but I cannot say it is deception. This is how it works in logic and jurisprudence.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #163:

From the perspective of "deceptive," there is no difference. Neither of them proves deception.

Because "intentionally chosen to mislead" and "intentionally chosen to do something else" are different intentions.
To prove "deceive," you need to prove "intentionally chosen to mislead," not just prove that the name was chosen intentionally.

Choosing a name that is false from an inductive point of view intentionally does not prove that it was chosen intentionally to mislead.

Intention to mislead is what distinguishes intentional misleading from unintentional — not the mere fact that the name was chosen intentionally or that it is false from an inductive point of view.

In logic and jurisprudence, it works the other way around. First, you prove that the action was performed intentionally with the purpose of misleading, and only after that the fact of deception is considered proven. If there is no such motive, then it cannot be considered deception.

This can be expressed as:
(I ∧ M) D, where:

I = action was done with the intention to mislead
M = the action misleads
D = it is deception

Just M (misleads) ≠ D.
Just I (intentional, but not for misleading) ≠ D.
Both I and M are required for D to be true.

For example, when you attributed to me something I did not claim, that’s an error — but not deception until I prove you did it intentionally to replace my argument, and not simply by mistake.

Exactly. If it’s proven that you chose the name intentionally but I have no proof that you did so with the intention to mislead, then I can say the name is misleading and false from an inductive point of view, but I cannot say it is deception.

This is how it works in logic and jurisprudence.

Well, yes, that's exactly how it works. Only a sincere confession can serve as proof of malicious intent. It can't be proven by generally accepted concepts. Even if you call black white, even if you call a six-month arena a year-long one.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #163: > From the perspective of "deceptive," there is no difference. Neither of them proves deception. > > > Because "intentionally chosen to mislead" and "intentionally chosen to do something else" are different intentions. > To prove "deceive," you need to prove "intentionally chosen to mislead," not just prove that the name was chosen intentionally. > > > Choosing a name that is false from an inductive point of view intentionally does not prove that it was chosen intentionally to mislead. > > Intention to mislead is what distinguishes intentional misleading from unintentional — not the mere fact that the name was chosen intentionally or that it is false from an inductive point of view. > > > In logic and jurisprudence, it works the other way around. First, you prove that the action was performed intentionally with the purpose of misleading, and only after that the fact of deception is considered proven. If there is no such motive, then it cannot be considered deception. > > This can be expressed as: > (I ∧ M) D, where: > > I = action was done with the intention to mislead > M = the action misleads > D = it is deception > > Just M (misleads) ≠ D. > Just I (intentional, but not for misleading) ≠ D. > Both I and M are required for D to be true. > > For example, when you attributed to me something I did not claim, that’s an error — but not deception until I prove you did it intentionally to replace my argument, and not simply by mistake. > > > Exactly. If it’s proven that you chose the name intentionally but I have no proof that you did so with the intention to mislead, then I can say the name is misleading and false from an inductive point of view, but I cannot say it is deception. > > This is how it works in logic and jurisprudence. Well, yes, that's exactly how it works. Only a sincere confession can serve as proof of malicious intent. It can't be proven by generally accepted concepts. Even if you call black white, even if you call a six-month arena a year-long one.

@Italiya said in #164:

Well, yes, that's exactly how it works. Only a sincere confession can serve as proof of malicious intent. It can't be proven by generally accepted concepts.
Yes, we have finally understood each other. A sincere confession can indeed serve as proof. But I also gave other examples — both with the "Round Table" case and with the Lichess example — of how the intent to deceive could be proven.

@Italiya said in #164:

Even if you call black white, even if you call a six-month arena a year-long one.
Correct, that would be an error from the standpoint of inductive truth. It can be pointed out and explained why it is such. But in order to speak of deception, one would still have to prove intent to mislead.

That is why I did not accuse you of deception when you distorted what I said, but merely pointed out the error and provided the exact quote.

Since the disputed point is now resolved, I suggest we conclude this discussion.

@Italiya said in #164: > Well, yes, that's exactly how it works. Only a sincere confession can serve as proof of malicious intent. It can't be proven by generally accepted concepts. Yes, we have finally understood each other. A sincere confession can indeed serve as proof. But I also gave other examples — both with the "Round Table" case and with the Lichess example — of how the intent to deceive could be proven. @Italiya said in #164: > Even if you call black white, even if you call a six-month arena a year-long one. Correct, that would be an error from the standpoint of inductive truth. It can be pointed out and explained why it is such. But in order to speak of deception, one would still have to prove intent to mislead. That is why I did not accuse you of deception when you distorted what I said, but merely pointed out the error and provided the exact quote. Since the disputed point is now resolved, I suggest we conclude this discussion.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #165:

Yes, we have finally understood each other. A sincere confession can indeed serve as proof. But I also gave other examples — both with the "Round Table" case and with the Lichess example — of how the intent to deceive could be proven.

Correct, that would be an error from the standpoint of inductive truth. It can be pointed out and explained why it is such. But in order to speak of deception, one would still have to prove intent to mislead.

That is why I did not accuse you of deception when you distorted what I said, but merely pointed out the error and provided the exact quote.

Since the disputed point is now resolved, I suggest we conclude this discussion.

<If it’s proven that you chose the name intentionally but I have no proof that you did so with the intention to mislead>

And what, can you intentionally mislead someone with good intentions?

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #165: > Yes, we have finally understood each other. A sincere confession can indeed serve as proof. But I also gave other examples — both with the "Round Table" case and with the Lichess example — of how the intent to deceive could be proven. > > > Correct, that would be an error from the standpoint of inductive truth. It can be pointed out and explained why it is such. But in order to speak of deception, one would still have to prove intent to mislead. > > That is why I did not accuse you of deception when you distorted what I said, but merely pointed out the error and provided the exact quote. > > Since the disputed point is now resolved, I suggest we conclude this discussion. <If it’s proven that you chose the name intentionally but I have no proof that you did so with the intention to mislead> And what, can you intentionally mislead someone with good intentions?

@Italiya said in #166:

And what, can you intentionally mislead someone with good intentions?
Depends on what “good intentions” means to you.
For me, the answer is “yes,” and examples would be: “to make it sound good,” “to be consistent,” or “to make a reference to some historical or generally recognized event.”
There could be many other intentions as well.

@Italiya said in #166: > And what, can you intentionally mislead someone with good intentions? Depends on what “good intentions” means to you. For me, the answer is “yes,” and examples would be: “to make it sound good,” “to be consistent,” or “to make a reference to some historical or generally recognized event.” There could be many other intentions as well.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #167:

Depends on what “good intentions” means to you.
For me, the answer is “yes,” and examples would be: “to make it sound good,” “to be consistent,” or “to make a reference to some historical or generally recognized event.”
There could be many other intentions as well.

<good intentions>

Or, in modern parlance, clickbait.
Which you may also deny. Hardly good intentions. A lie will remain a lie, and adding the word "inductive" will not change that. On the contrary, inductive deception is a more sophisticated deception.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #167: > Depends on what “good intentions” means to you. > For me, the answer is “yes,” and examples would be: “to make it sound good,” “to be consistent,” or “to make a reference to some historical or generally recognized event.” > There could be many other intentions as well. <good intentions> Or, in modern parlance, clickbait. Which you may also deny. Hardly good intentions. A lie will remain a lie, and adding the word "inductive" will not change that. On the contrary, inductive deception is a more sophisticated deception.

@Italiya said in #168 :

Or, in modern parlance, clickbait.
This is an equivocation. I never claimed that the intention to attract attention through deception counts as “good intentions.”
You expanded the category of good intentions to a deliberately negative example that I never mentioned. That’s a distortion of meaning.

@Italiya said in #168 :

A lie will remain a lie, and adding the word "inductive" will not change that.
I’ve already explained in message #118 the difference between “a lie” and “inductively false.”
Here’s the quote:
In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation—like calling a semi-annual event “Yearly Arena,” which is factually false because it happens twice a year. A “lie,” however, implies intent to deceive, which isn’t part of inductive reasoning.

As a result, we reached the conclusions stated in message #165. Why are you going back to a point I’ve already addressed and we’ve already discussed? You’re now looping the discussion without adding anything new, which shifts this conversation into the realm of spam. It looks like you’re simply trying to have the last word when there’s nothing substantive left to argue — and that kind of exchange doesn’t belong in this section of the forum.

@Italiya said in #168 :

On the contrary, inductive deception is a more sophisticated deception.
You’re once again conflating different concepts. As I stated above:
In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation. Inductive reasoning has nothing to do with the concept of “deception.”

Please don’t use terminology you haven’t fully understood. First get familiar with it, and then apply it.

@Italiya said in #168 : > Or, in modern parlance, clickbait. This is an equivocation. I never claimed that the intention to attract attention through deception counts as “good intentions.” You expanded the category of good intentions to a deliberately negative example that I never mentioned. That’s a distortion of meaning. @Italiya said in #168 : > A lie will remain a lie, and adding the word "inductive" will not change that. I’ve already explained in message #118 the difference between “a lie” and “inductively false.” Here’s the quote: In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation—like calling a semi-annual event “Yearly Arena,” which is factually false because it happens twice a year. A “lie,” however, implies intent to deceive, which isn’t part of inductive reasoning. As a result, we reached the conclusions stated in message #165. Why are you going back to a point I’ve already addressed and we’ve already discussed? You’re now looping the discussion without adding anything new, which shifts this conversation into the realm of spam. It looks like you’re simply trying to have the last word when there’s nothing substantive left to argue — and that kind of exchange doesn’t belong in this section of the forum. @Italiya said in #168 : > On the contrary, inductive deception is a more sophisticated deception. You’re once again conflating different concepts. As I stated above: In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation. Inductive reasoning has nothing to do with the concept of “deception.” Please don’t use terminology you haven’t fully understood. First get familiar with it, and then apply it.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #169:

@Italiya said in #168 :

This is an equivocation. I never claimed that the intention to attract attention through deception counts as “good intentions.”
You expanded the category of good intentions to a deliberately negative example that I never mentioned. That’s a distortion of meaning.

@Italiya said in #168 :

I’ve already explained in message #118 the difference between “a lie” and “inductively false.”
Here’s the quote:
In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation—like calling a semi-annual event “Yearly Arena,” which is factually false because it happens twice a year. A “lie,” however, implies intent to deceive, which isn’t part of inductive reasoning.

As a result, we reached the conclusions stated in message #165. Why are you going back to a point I’ve already addressed and we’ve already discussed? You’re now looping the discussion without adding anything new, which shifts this conversation into the realm of spam. It looks like you’re simply trying to have the last word when there’s nothing substantive left to argue — and that kind of exchange doesn’t belong in this section of the forum.

@Italiya said in #168 :

You’re once again conflating different concepts. As I stated above:
In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation. Inductive reasoning has nothing to do with the concept of “deception.”

Please don’t use terminology you haven’t fully understood. First get familiar with it, and then apply it.

What kind of general non-compliance is there to fall under the definition of inductance? This is just a clickbait title.

@Jean_Gunfighter said in #169: > @Italiya said in #168 : > > This is an equivocation. I never claimed that the intention to attract attention through deception counts as “good intentions.” > You expanded the category of good intentions to a deliberately negative example that I never mentioned. That’s a distortion of meaning. > > @Italiya said in #168 : > > I’ve already explained in message #118 the difference between “a lie” and “inductively false.” > Here’s the quote: > In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation—like calling a semi-annual event “Yearly Arena,” which is factually false because it happens twice a year. A “lie,” however, implies intent to deceive, which isn’t part of inductive reasoning. > > As a result, we reached the conclusions stated in message #165. Why are you going back to a point I’ve already addressed and we’ve already discussed? You’re now looping the discussion without adding anything new, which shifts this conversation into the realm of spam. It looks like you’re simply trying to have the last word when there’s nothing substantive left to argue — and that kind of exchange doesn’t belong in this section of the forum. > > @Italiya said in #168 : > > You’re once again conflating different concepts. As I stated above: > In logic, an inductive falsehood is a statement that doesn’t hold under general observation. Inductive reasoning has nothing to do with the concept of “deception.” > > Please don’t use terminology you haven’t fully understood. First get familiar with it, and then apply it. What kind of general non-compliance is there to fall under the definition of inductance? This is just a clickbait title.

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