In philosophy there is a trend that seems to have leaked into the chess world so to speak.
What I mean is this, as follows (and forgive me for my technical jargon; you can also look at this post as an introduction to philosophy :)):
The great English philosopher George Edward Moore proved over a century ago that the world exists; we'll give him that.
However, I think it's important to point out emphatically what he does *NOT* prove:
Firstly, he doesn't prove that the world that exists equates to the world which we think exists (as Kant masterfully shows or proves in his first Critique).
He proves that the world exists because he proves that what he calls external "objects" exist.
And yes, it does follow that there are objects and therefore the world which encompasses these objects in space.
But he doesn't say just *HOW* we know that there are objects which exist beyond our intersubjective confirmation or agreement.
The short answer is (as in Hume): "constant conjunction"; however such is beyond the scope of our article. It has to do more with cognitive science, if anything, than it does modern philosophy.
So Moore essentially starts the trend which moves philosophy away from this cognitive science approach and towards a "common sense" view of the world.
How do we know that the object exists? Come close and feel it for yourself is the common sense answer; it's part of the "game" as Wittgenstein describes it.
However, such games I argue aren't or shouldn't be the point of philosophy.
Rather, philosophy should try to tackle scientific problems through a unique methodological lens, and not to produce "empty ideas" as the American philosopher Peter Unger calls it.
Similarly too, in chess, there are all of these empty opening novelties which are being produced at a hare's pace, which are nice on the surface, however superfluous.
Do you agree?
What I mean is this, as follows (and forgive me for my technical jargon; you can also look at this post as an introduction to philosophy :)):
The great English philosopher George Edward Moore proved over a century ago that the world exists; we'll give him that.
However, I think it's important to point out emphatically what he does *NOT* prove:
Firstly, he doesn't prove that the world that exists equates to the world which we think exists (as Kant masterfully shows or proves in his first Critique).
He proves that the world exists because he proves that what he calls external "objects" exist.
And yes, it does follow that there are objects and therefore the world which encompasses these objects in space.
But he doesn't say just *HOW* we know that there are objects which exist beyond our intersubjective confirmation or agreement.
The short answer is (as in Hume): "constant conjunction"; however such is beyond the scope of our article. It has to do more with cognitive science, if anything, than it does modern philosophy.
So Moore essentially starts the trend which moves philosophy away from this cognitive science approach and towards a "common sense" view of the world.
How do we know that the object exists? Come close and feel it for yourself is the common sense answer; it's part of the "game" as Wittgenstein describes it.
However, such games I argue aren't or shouldn't be the point of philosophy.
Rather, philosophy should try to tackle scientific problems through a unique methodological lens, and not to produce "empty ideas" as the American philosopher Peter Unger calls it.
Similarly too, in chess, there are all of these empty opening novelties which are being produced at a hare's pace, which are nice on the surface, however superfluous.
Do you agree?
